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Abstract
This article tackles the relationship between interculturalism and multiculturalism from
the points of view of both. Interculturalism owes its existence to a critique of
multiculturalism, but of highly distorted visions of it. I distinguish between two versions
of interculturalism, a majoritarian (practiced in Québec) and a post-majoritarian (in
Europe), which yield diametrically opposed visions of multiculturalism, as either footloose
cosmopolitan or parochial-segregationist. Among the problems of interculturalism is the
vacuity of the local as its preferred site of intervention, and its rushed embracing of
“diversity” that is also a central plank of neoliberal ideology.
Introduction
Over the past decade or so, "interculturalism" has established itself as new approach to
manage cultural diversity in liberal-democratic societies (a comprehensive overview is
Grillo, 2017). While its near-namesake "multiculturalism" is heavily contested or even
discarded in more and more places, especially in Europe, interculturalism enjoys un-
bridled support, particularly among policy elites, and it has been firmly institutional-
ized, for instance, in pedagogy or social work, whose curricula now include required
courses in "intercultural competence". In Germany, never a standard-bearer of multi-
culturalism, recent integration laws passed in several Länder prominently sport the "in-
tercultural opening of public administration", which requires the state bureaucracy to
be attentive to the linguistic, religious, and other cultural needs of its immigrant-based
clientele. The latter even entails prioritizing the hiring of people with a "migration
background" (mit Migrationshintergrund), now the official speak for the near 20% of
the German resident population with at least one foreign parent.
Several elements mark interculturalism:
 a stress on communication and "dialogue" across ethnic (as still the most critical of
cultural) boundaries—hence the "inter" in the name;
 a preference for the local over the national as site of policy intervention and group
and interpersonal exchange;
 a concrete policy as against abstract theoretical focus, and closely related, a
preference for pragmatic and compromise-minded over principled reasoning and
decision-making;
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 finally, a non-ideological diction and cross-party appeal (all these elements can be
found in Zapata-Barrero, 2017).
In each of these respects interculturalism derives its distinction in contrast to a dis-
carded multiculturalism,
 as favoring group separation over inter-group exchange and finding a common
ground;
 as being into national-level grand posturing while ignoring the local hic et nunc;
 as being largely theoretical and aloof of concrete policy concerns;
 and as showing itself unprepared for compromising its radical and purist agenda.
One understands that particularly moderate and liberal defenders of multiculturalism
(others are hardly around anymore) are not amused, rejecting the intercultural critique
as “a misrepresentation, even caricature, of multiculturalism theories and approaches”
(Kymlicka, 2016, p. 158) (see also Modood, 2017, p. 2).
Mutual (mis) perceptions
A closer look reveals the intercultural critique of multiculturalism and the multicultural
meta-critique, as well as the suggested affinities and oppositions from both parties’
point of view, to be more variegated and less categorical than first meets the eye. Let
us look at two prominent examples on each side, beginning with the interculturalists.
Perhaps the most strident of them is Cantle, a British community organizer who be-
came famous for launching the British policy turn, after a wave of race riots in several
northern English towns in the summer of 2001, from multiculturalism to ‘community
cohesion’. He sees little in common with an opposed multiculturalism, promoting inter-
culturalism as “a completely different concept which reflects the new realities of diver-
sity” (Cantle, 2016, p. 472). Apart from faulting multiculturalism for having fueled
“parallel lives” and group segregation (which is interculturalism’s standard charge that
has never been backed by solid evidence), he finds it guilty of having prioritized “race
(and class)” (a very British combination, alluding to the radical journal under that
name) over other forms of diversity, many of which are more on the voluntary than
strictly ascribed pole, like “mixed race”, “sexual orientation”, or “faith differences”, and
which he sees growing in the contemporary period. He cites the example of a
“Glaswegian, Pakistani teenager of Muslim descent who supports Glasgow Rangers in a
Catholic School” (Cantle, 2016, p. 476), who is not well served by a “tick-box classifica-
tion which homogenizes communities under the single aspect of their identities”
(Cantle, 2016, p. 477). However, even if this youngster may hold “a different identity at
home compared to that at school”, Cantle’s assumption that “she might have a different
identity next week” (Cantle, 2016, p. 477) may go a bit far. Modood (2016, p. 487)
rightly retorts that some identities are more painfully experienced and disadvantaging
than others, and that it is these that are targeted by multiculturalism: “We cannot
require all minorities to wear their identities lightly, flexibly and contextually.” One
does not have to endorse Modood’s “groupist” multiculturalism to question intercultur-
alism’s extreme multiplication of identities, which also militates against the policy
relevance that interculturalists otherwise pride themselves for.
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A less combative note is struck by a second prominent defender of interculturalism,
Zapata-Barrero (2017), who depicts interculturalism not as substitutive of but “comple-
mentary” to multiculturalism. He even argues that a fully developed “recognition of
rights” (which he attributes to multiculturalism) is necessary for interculturalism’s
“contact”-orientation to take off (p. 6). In Zapata-Barrero’s view, interculturalism arises
in a “post-multicultural” moment of anti-multiculturalist backlash, financial crisis
(favoring low-cost, “mainstreaming” policy solutions to diversity), and “superdiversity”
with its multiple identity and post-race issues, where diversity is even eroding the
notion of a homogeneous “majority”. More concretely, interculturalism figures for him
as “mediator” between, on the one side, an increasingly discarded multiculturalism and,
on the other side, duty-focused civic integration policies, whose impulse of limits to
tolerance and of finding a common ground is taken on board by his (and all other
versions of) interculturalism. For Zapata-Barrero, the joint problem of both alterna-
tives, multiculturalism and civic integration, which he sees locked in a vicious circle, is
to locate diversity only on the part of minorities, whereby diversity becomes “the other”
of the majority, while the need of the day is “placing diversity within the mainstream”
(p. 6) (this is also the meaning of Cantle’s plea to “live in diversity” (Cantle, 2016)).
While this sounds plausible as a sociological fact, the implications for policy are again a
lot less clear, or rather: frustratingly broad and fungible. Because, if diversity is every-
where it is also nowhere in particular, becoming an empty slogan deployable in almost
any direction one likes, by business, for instance (see below).
In the multiculturalist meta-critique, interculturalism is at best “a version of multicul-
turalism rather than…an alternative paradigm” (Modood, 2017, p. 1). For Modood,
interculturalism helps multiculturalism to correct some of its weaknesses, making it
more true to itself in the process, as non-essentialist and dialogue-oriented as its pre-
sumed opponent and itself a center-building rather than center-fleeing “multicultural
nationalism”. In sum, interculturalism and multiculturalism are “critical friends”, not
“alternatives” (Modood, 2016, p. 487). Less ground is conceded by Kymlicka (2016), for
whom interculturalism serves merely “rhetorical functions”, namely, to continue multi-
culturalism`s progressive agenda under the mantle of repudiating it in name. But as the
price for it is sacking multiculturalism, this risks legitimizing the nationalist populism
that has given a bad name to multiculturalism in the first.
This leaves us with a contradictory medley of multiculturalism-interculturalism link-
ages, from mutually exclusive and substitutive to closely linked if not near-identical.
Not one but two: majoritarian v. post-majoritarian interculturalism
Much as there is no agreement about what multiculturalism is, it should not surprise
that interculturalism, as it has come into existence only by way of a critique of multi-
culturalism (see Grillo, 2017, chapter 2), shares the problem of its criticized other to be
notoriously elusive and difficult to define. But if there are several variants of multicul-
turalism (see Joppke, 2017, chapter 2), on the part of interculturalism it comes down to
just two, which still rest on (or yield) diametrically opposed visions of what multicultur-
alism is. Let’s call one “majoritarian” interculturalism, which entails the curious vision
of multiculturalism as footloose, cosmopolitan diversity, and let’s call the other “post-
majoritarian”, for which multiculturalism, on the opposite, is caught in an anachronistic
majority-minority dualism.
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Majoritarian interculturalism has its roots in francophone Québec and the province’s
nationalist-cum-secessionist leanings within Anglophone Canada. Interculturalism is
Québec’s answer to Canadian multiculturalism, which it has always rejected for
watering-down its nationalist ambition. In Bouchard’s (2011) formulation, intercultural-
ism is a code word for “majority precedence”, that is, the respect for and acceptance of
the francophone majority culture by immigrants. This includes acceptance of French as
public language (including the controversial obligation on immigrants to have their
children schooled in French), “predominance to the majority narrative in national
memory and history courses” (“je me souviens” is Québec’s official motto, adorning the
province’s car license plates), the privileging of Christianity in the school curriculum,
the burial of heads of State in Catholic churches, to keep the Christian cross on the
Québec flag, Christmas decoration in public squares and buildings, and the sounding
bells of Catholic churches (Bouchard, 2011, p. 459). Bouchard calls this majority prece-
dence “ad hoc” or “contextual”, distinguishing it from the “formal” precedence that, for
instance, France imposes on its immigrants in terms of Republicanism. Indeed, what is
striking in Bouchard’s catalogue is the predominance of linguistic and religious entries
and, conversely, the complete absence of universalist and more political values or prin-
ciples, such as freedom or equality, which are central to most other country’s
pluralism-containing core commitments. This peculiarity is due to the fact that
universalist-political values can’t distinguish Québec from the rest of Canada. Quebe-
cois particularism flies because “the francophone majority is itself a precarious minority
that needs protection in order to ensure its survival” (Bouchard, 2011, p. 441).
This raises the interesting question whether “majority precedence” as the defining
feature of majoritarian interculturalism is limited to the specific situation of Québec - a
minority nation within a multinational state - or is generalizable to all nation-states in
which there is a majority not wishing to be weakened or even extinguished by immigra-
tion. We shall see that every form of interculturalism will stress the importance of core
values and principles that it does not want to see compromised by immigrant diversity.
However, outside Québec this common core is strictly universalist and limited to the
exigencies of liberal democracy itself (including a more functional approach to language
as medium of communication rather than badge of identity).
What is “multiculturalism” according to an interculturalism that is primarily protect-
ive of “majority culture” (Bouchard, 2011, p. 438)? First, it denies any communality be-
tween the two (though in effect, there may be little difference between them, as argues
Taylor, 2012), and as a matter of fact all Québec governments have rejected Canadian
multiculturalism ever since it was introduced in 1971. More controversially, Canadian
multiculturalism, and with it all other forms of multiculturalism in Australia, Sweden,
the United States, or India, are seen by Bouchard (2011 p. 441) as beholden to a “diver-
sity” paradigm, in which there is “no recognition of a majority culture.” This is as if
Patten’s (2014) plea for a neutrality-based multiculturalism of states without a Favorit-
volk had come true. This may make sense for Canada or Australia, whose historical
majority culture was an ancestral Britishness that had strongly racial connotations,
excluding through their immigration and citizenship policies all Asians or Africans well
into the 1960s, and even longer in Australia. However, Bouchard’s equation of multicul-
turalism with a symmetric diversity policy that does not recognize a majority culture
greatly conflates different nation-state amalgams and resulting multiculturalism forms;
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above all, it denies the possibility, stressed by some of its theorists from Modood to
Kymlicka, that multiculturalism itself could become a defining mark of majority culture
if not of nationhood, which seems to be the case precisely for post-racist settler states
like Canada and Australia (but not the United States, which separated from Britain
early and disposes of a strong own founding myth).
One might think that majoritarian interculturalism, which operates with a majority-
minority dualism, would provide a model for Europe, with its ethnic nation-state legacies
(this is the assumption by Taylor, 2012). In reality, a different, post-majoritarian form of
interculturalism has emerged in Europe. Its central document is the Council of Europe’s
White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue, entitled “Living Together as Equals in Dignity”
(Council of Europe, 2008). Espousing the interculturalism that is recognizable in the pages
of Cantle or Zapata-Barrero, the White Paper advocates “intercultural dialogue” as alter-
native to a multiculturalism that “had been found inadequate” in this respect, on the one
hand, and to an anyway long-denigrated “assimilation”, on the other hand. Both are found
guilty of “the same, schematic conception of society set in opposition of majority and mi-
nority, differing only in endorsing separation of the minority from the majority…(or) as-
similation to it” (Council of Europe, 2008, p. 18). Whereas in Québec-style majoritarian
interculturalism “diversity” is lodged on the opposite side of a majority-denying, cosmo-
politan multiculturalism, here the starting assumption is the fact of “unprecedented and
ever-growing” diversity (p. 9) this side of the divide, rendering anachronistic “old ap-
proaches”, multiculturalism included. Obviously, the new approach wanes diversity on its
side, as argument to go beyond the groupist majority-minority binary that multicultural-
ism is said to be caught in while fueling “communal segregation” and “mutual incompre-
hension” (p. 19).
While the “multiculturalism” appearing through the majoritarian interculturalism lens
barely matched any real-world multiculturalism, in fact transformed it into cosmopolitan-
ism, post-majoritarian interculturalism suffers from the reverse problem of reduplicating
the grossest stereotypes about multiculturalism, as separatist and “undermining the rights
of individuals”, women in particular (Council of Europe, 2008, p. 19). Therefore there is
the same emphasis on fleshing out a common core as in majoritarian interculturalism,
only that in the post-majoritarian variant the common core is not particularist but univer-
salist, consisting of the core principles of liberal democracy. The “common identity”,
which multiculturalism is accused of to have slighted or even violated, is dubbed “equality
of human dignity”, “an ethos of respect for the equal dignity of every individual and hospi-
tality towards the wider world” (p. 14). Furthermore, “intrinsic to such an ethos is dialogue
and interaction with others” (p. 14). Distinguishing itself from multiculturalism and as-
similation alike, interculturalism thus understood “incorporates the best of both. It takes
from assimilation the focus on the individual; it takes from multiculturalism the recogni-
tion of cultural diversity. And it adds the new element, critical to integration and social
cohesion, of dialogue and the basis of equal dignity and shared values” (p. 19).
Alas, which multiculturalist would deny the “equality of human dignity”, which in
Taylor’s multicultural Programmschrift (Taylor, 1994) is exactly the starting-point for
the modern “politics of equal recognition”, of which multiculturalism is only the
difference-emphasizing variant? Which multiculturalist, in turn, would advance a total
relativism of values and cultures, including honor killings, genital mutilation and other
extreme practices, as seems to be the charge of the interculturalists? Moreover, when it
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comes to concrete policy proposals, the Council of Europe White Paper (2008) offers
little beyond the standard fare long known from the liberal multiculturalism agenda:
“positive action” (p. 39), “clear legislation and policies against discrimination” (p. 37),
and local voting rights for immigrants (p. 42). Moreover, if “every form of
stigmatization of persons belonging to minority and disadvantaged groups in public
discourse needs to be ruled out” (p. 42), interculturalism even seems to endorse the re-
strictions on free speech and imposition of behavioural etiquettes that multiculturalists
like Tariq Modood and Bhikhu Parekh, controversially (see the debate edited by
Hansen, 2006), have demanded during the perennial Islam conflicts, from Rushdie’s
Satanic Verses to the Danish Cartoons.
Multiculturalism in a liberal register
The pros and cons of multiculturalism have been extensively debated, so there is no
need to repeat this here. Suffice it to say that, in my view (Joppke, 2017), the legal-
constitutional resources of liberal states are more capacious than even the most convin-
cing liberal theories of multiculturalism, those by Kymlicka (1995) and Patten (2014),
have realized. So there is less need for explicitly “multicultural” policy commitments
than commonly believed. Take again the case of Germany, which is an interesting case
for its political hostility to but legal embracing of multiculturalism. In the recent juris-
diction of its higher courts, one can register an interesting equilibrium between multi-
cultural and more centrist, civic commitments, and one could not even say where one
ends and the other begins. For instance, for the sake of being socialized into a pluralis-
tic society with many diverse lifestyles, Muslim school girls must stomach the view of
boys in “tightly cut swimwear”, so that there is no exemption for them from co-
educational swimming lessons in public schools.1 However, the same endorsement of
pluralism implies, in turn, that non-Muslim pupils must endure the sight of a
headscarf-wearing school teacher, who is only exercising the constitutional right to
practice her religion.2 While both judgments yielded opposite outcomes - the refusal of
a religious exemption request and the validation of an Islamic headscarf claim, respect-
ively - they both affirm cultural pluralism, perhaps a preferable term to the spent
“multiculturalism”. There is no alternative to pluralism and diversity, protected by the
law, in a liberal society. This becomes especially clear when it is challenged, which is
no rare event in the current climate of nationalist populism. Take German Interior
Minister Thomas de Mazières recent foray for a “German Leitkultur”, strangely entitled
“We Are Not Burka”.3 He cites the example of shaking hands as part of the German
way of life. This is an informal practice that, of course, is not prescribed by law, and
thus it goes beyond mere “constitutional patriotism” as the minimal integration re-
quirement of a liberal society. Instead, the handshake points to something that keeps
together German society “im Innersten” (in the innermost), and that “defines us and
distinguishes us from others”, hence, the Germans’ Leitkultur. Habermas (2017) quickly
responded that as informal cultural practice the handshake could not be made a legal
obligation—then the “high five”, popular not only among youngsters, would have to be
prohibited. Habermas overlooked that the Interior Minster saw that himself: “The word
leiten (leading) means something else than to prescribe (vorschreiben) or to oblige
(verpflichten)”, one can read in his pamphlet. His plea for a German Leitkultur does not
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entail the renunciation of pluralism. Multiculturalism is not dead but very much alive
in Germany, despite Chancellor Merkel’s famous diction that it has “utterly failed”.
Vacuity of the local
Multiculturalism is actually a much better, because nicely ambiguous and multivocal
term for the pluralism that is inevitable in a liberal society than the neologism “inter-
culturalism”. The drawback of the latter is to immediately point to a program or policy
under its name. But which? From the city context, the true home ground of intercultur-
alism, one knows that the “inter” refers to mayoral support for “projects” rather than
“groups” (Uitermark, Rossi, & Van Houtum, 2005). But is there anything more to say
than what this or that city does in the name of the “inter”, which might just as well go
under the label “multi”, or under no particular label at all, as in “keeping things
together”, which is Amsterdam charismatic mayor Job Cohen`s description of his prag-
matic approach? In Zapata-Barrero’s (2017, p. 141) appraisal of local and policy-savvy
interculturalism, we learn that the main “concern” is “over how to manage contact in
public spaces”. He lists the following “spaces” where “contact” is to occur: “community
gardens, libraries, public amenities, festivals and neighbourhood spaces” (ibid.). What
should one make of this? Communication in such settings is the kind of thing that city
or district administrations have always and by definition been concerned about, what
else are public places for? These places are nothing if not used by people, and what else
should the latter do in them but talk or listen or read or gaze, all of which are commu-
nicative acts of sorts, even if the listening is to the whales (inside)? What are the specif-
ically “intercultural” elements to this, except that an ethnic line is crossed, which is a
trivia because shared humanity must always be at work?
One should mention here that a measure that, of course, is not of the intercultural
tool box, the recent burka laws of France, Belgium, or Austria, which prohibit to cover
one’s face in all public spaces, are exactly meant to facilitate communication and “dia-
logue” across ethnic group boundaries. In the French justification of the law before the
European Court of Human Rights, the burka interrupts the “reciprocity” and the avail-
ability for communication that is said to be the life-blood of “civil society”.4 Weirdly,
the French government construed it to be the “right of others” that any person, includ-
ing the pious Muslim woman, be always available for communication at any one time
one pleases. As this “right” entails the obligation to always be available for communica-
tion, it naturally cannot be found in the European Convention of Human Rights. Of
course, no interculturalist endorses forced “contact” of this sort. Because the point
about “contact” is that it cannot be forced, at least not in a liberal society worth the
name. But then you cannot say more about it than “nice” when it happens (and all goes
well in its course), and just register a fact beyond your control, except perhaps trying to
establish a “choice architecture” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) that may facilitate talk and
walk across group lines - say, placing a playground not within but at the intersection of
two ethnic neighborhoods. The local as site of integration, though proverbially the site
of integration, is entirely vacuous for the purposes of theory and better left to those
who live and act it out at their discretion - too much state and policy there can only do
harm, as in the notorious burka laws.
In fact, the burka laws, except the one in force in the Swiss canton of Ticino, are na-
tional laws, which shows the dangers of vacating the national in favor of the local.
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Kymlicka (2016) pointed out that “local projects of intercultural interaction (will) al-
ways be fragile in the absence of an explicit state commitment to redefining nation-
hood” (p. 172). His multiculturalism theory rests on the assumption that the “link
between nationhood and liberal democracy creates systematic risks” for minorities
(p. 168), which for the sake of liberal justice have to be compensated by multicultural
minority rights. While the prospects for “multicultural nationhood”, which Kymlicka
endorses much like Modood, may be somewhat hopeful for most European countries,
the impulse not to leave “the nation” to the “exclusionary narrative” of the populists is a
valid one (p. 174).
Problems with diversity
Interculturalists outside Québec have too lightly dismissed the majority-minority binary
as anachronistic, and they have gone too far in indigenizing diversity, that is, generaliz-
ing it beyond the case of minorities and deeming the very majority category obsolete. It
is not yet the case that “most so-called citizens have an immigrant background”
(Zapata-Barrero, 2017, p. 15). This does not mean that the majority category is unprob-
lematic, quite the contrary. While interculturalists (outside Québec) dismiss the
category as such, even liberals have started to debate whether majorities might need
protection today. In democratic theory, majorities have always been viewed with
skeptical eyes, as bent on “tyranny” if not checked by liberal constitutions that protect
minorities qua individual rights. As Liav Orgad argues sharply, the “inevitable outcome
of multiculturalism”, understood as scheme of minority rights, is the concept of a
“distinctive cultural majority” (Orgad, 2016, p. 3), which nevertheless remains legally
uncharted. Considering recent demographic and immigration trends, with shrinking
native populations and growing immigrant diasporas of ever more distant origins, re-
spectively, perhaps the moment has come for something as paradoxical as a “liberal
theory of majority rights” (Orgad, 2015). In a way, Orgad generalizes the Quebecois
constellation of an embattled minority nation, while wisely endorsing only the Euro-
pean solution of “national constitutionalism” for defining the not-to-be-compromised
common core. “National constitutionalism” strongly resembles “constitutional patriot-
ism” as liberal formula of identity and unity in a diverse society. Calling this a theory of
majority rights may thus be a misnomer, because all cultural particularism, except the
one that supports and frames a particular instance of a liberal constitution, has been
purged from it. The message is that whatever a “majority” is, it is a site of intense con-
testation, and interculturalism has too quickly dispensed with it in toto.
Conversely, interculturalists have too quickly embarked on the treacherous train of
diversity, including its instrumentalist and business-minded variant of “diversity advan-
tage” (Zapata-Barrero, 2017, p. 13). Kymlicka (2015, p. 21) is more on the mark when
attacking “neoliberal multiculturalism” as “inclusion without solidarity”, whereby
“equality” is reduced to “equal access to (or perhaps better: equal exposure to) the com-
petitive global marketplace”. When “diversity” was created as a legal term, it was an
argument against a remedial-justice oriented interpretation of American civil rights
law, and it couched American society in the history-distorting colors of a “nation of
minorities”, whites included (see Joppke, 2017, pp. 57–58). From US Supreme Court
Justice Powell’s invention on, “diversity” has been devoid of a justice dimension and
presented as in the interest of domain-specific efficiency. No wonder that it quickly
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became a dominant management philosophy, led by the diction that “a more diverse
workforce will…bring greater access to new segments of the marketplace” (Kelly &
Dobbin, 1998, p. 962). In the United States, diversity management replaced affirmative
action programs, which became inopportune during the 1980s Reagan administration
and henceforth were associated with ethnic one-upmanship. A manager in Kodak com-
pany’s Global Diversity Office puts it thus: “Diversity is not about advancing the agenda
of special groups. Diversity includes everyone, and it requires the buy-in and commit-
ment of all of our employees. It is diversity of ideas - not just race” (quoted in Joppke,
2017, p. 59). An add by corporate investment giant Merrill Lynch performs diversity’s
reductio ad absurdum: “Be yourself. Race. Ethnicity. Religion. Nationality. Gender.
Sexual orientation. In the end, there’s just one variety of human being. The individual.
All six billion of us. Be bullish. Merrill Lynch” (Joppke, 2017, p. 57). If interculturalism
buys into “diversity advantage”, as Zapata-Barrero (2017) suggests it does and should, it
is cow-towing to neoliberalism.
War of words
The querelle between interculturalism and multiculturalism, picked by an intercultural-
ism that has come into life only as a critique of multiculturalism, is in the first a war of
words, despite some different accents here or there set by the interculturalists - in my
view, not enough to warrant the neologism. I confer with Kymlicka and Modood’s view
that interculturalists give a distorted picture of multiculturalism (particularly its liberal
variant), and Kymlicka is also to the point about the mainly “rhetorical functions” and
attending risks of the new speak. The great advantage of the multiculturalists is to have,
at least, theories to bite one’s teeth into, while the interculturalists have little to nothing
on offer in this respect. This does not mean to endorse the multicultural agenda of an
explicitly group-recognizing and -protecting policy, which underrates the power of
liberal constitutionalism to perform much of its tasks, short of its name. If one of the
two terms is to be retained, it should be “multiculturalism”, because of its stubborn
justice instincts. “Interculturalism” (outside Québec) concedes too much to the dual
reign of neoliberalism and nationalist populism in our globalizing business civilization.
Endnotes
1BVerG 6 C 25.12, 11 September 2013.
2BvR 471/10 and 1 BvR 1181/10, 27 January 2015.
3First published in the popular tabloid Bild-Zeitung, it is reprinted under the strange
title “Wir sind nicht Burka” (We Are Not Burka) in Zeit Online, 30 April 2017.
4ECtHR, S.A.S. v. France, 1 July 2014.
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